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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
THE STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : 
v. 
MICHAEL TODD MCARTHUR, : Case No. 981421-CA 
Priority No. 2 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal from judgment 
of conviction for Burglary of a Dwelling, a second degree felony, 
and Theft, a second degree felony, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-2a-3(2) (e) (1996) . A copy of the judgment is in Addendum A. 
TEXT OF CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION 
The text of the Fourth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution is in Addendum B. 
ISSUES, STANDARDS OF REVIEW, PRESERVATION 
Issue: Whether the search of Appellant's home violated the 
Fourth Amendment, requiring that items seized pursuant to the 
search warrant and statements made by Appellant be suppressed. 
A. Whether Aimee acted as an agent for Deputy 
Delahunty when she entered McArthur's home and seized 
evidence. 
B. Whether items seized by police officers when acting 
pursuant to a search warrant must be suppressed since the 
search warrant was the fruit of Aimee's prior illegal 
search. 
C. Whether Deputy Delahunty recklessly or 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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intentionally included false statements and omitted material 
information from the affidavit, requiring suppression of 
items seized pursuant to the search warrant. 
D. Whether McArthur's statements upon arrest should be 
suppressed as the fruit of the Fourth Amendment violation. 
Standard of Review: This Court "review[s] the factual 
findings underlying the trial court's decision to grant or deny a 
motion to suppress using a clearly erroneous standard. [It] 
review[s] the trial court's conclusions of law based on these 
facts under a correctness standard." State v. Brown, 853 P.2d 
851, 854 (Utah 1992) (citing State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774, 
781-82 (Utah 1991)). 
Preservation: The issues raised in this appeal were 
preserved by Appellant's motion to suppress (R. 24-26), the 
hearing on the motion to suppress (R. 114), and the trial judge's 
ruling (R. 92). See Addenda C and D. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
On July 9, 1997, the State filed an Information charging 
Defendant/Appellant Michael Todd McArthur ("Appellant" or 
"McArthur") with one count of Burglary, a second degree felony in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-202 (1995), and one count of 
theft, a second degree felony in violation of Utah Code Ann. 
§ 76-6-404 (1995). 
Prior to trial, Appellant filed a motion to suppress the 
evidence seized from his home. R. 24-26. A copy of the motion 
is in Addendum C. After the state filed its responsive 
2 
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memorandum (R. 28-37), the trial judge held an evidentiary 
hearing on the suppression motion. R. 38. Thereafter, the trial 
judge denied Appellant's motion to suppress and requested that 
the state prepare the order. R. 38. 
The state prepared proposed findings of fact and conclusions 
of law which did not accurately reflect the trial court's rulings 
and which contained findings which were not made by the trial 
judge. R. 75-76, 92. Appellant objected to the findings and 
conclusions prepared by the state, and submitted proposed 
findings and conclusions which were patterned after the trial 
judge's actual ruling. R. 89-90.x Thereafter, the trial judge 
issued a minute entry adopting the findings and conclusions 
prepared by Appellant. R. 92. A copy of the findings and 
conclusions is in Addendum D. The transcript of the trial 
judge's oral findings is also in Addendum D. R. 114:105-06. 
On January 16, 1998, Appellant entered a conditional plea of 
guilty to Theft, a second degree felony, and Burglary, a second 
degree felony. That plea was made pursuant to Ut.R.Crim.P. 11 
and State v. Serv, 758 P.2d 935, 937-38 (Utah App. 1988), and 
preserved for appeal the denial of Appellant's motion to 
suppress. R. 51-58. On June 22, 1998, the trial judge entered 
judgment, sentencing Appellant to two concurrent terms of one to 
fifteen years at the Utah State Prison, and staying execution of 
1
 Appellant continued to maintain his Fourth Amendment claim. 
Appellant's submission of findings and conclusions which reflected 
the judge's actual ruling did not waive that claim; instead, it 
simply provided the judge with a written statement of his previous 
ruling. 
3 
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the prison sentence and placing Appellant on probation on the 
condition he serve 12 months in jail and various other terms. 
R. 99. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On July 1, 1997, Deputy Vaun Delahunty2 obtained a search 
warrant to search the McArthur residence located at 2802 East 
3900 South in Salt Lake County. State's Exhibit (IfExh.M) 1; see 
Addendum E. The affidavit in support of the search warrant 
indicated that certain property consisting of a Waterford Crystal 
ashtray, various Lladro porcelain statues and a gold Dunhill 
cigarette lighter, which the officer believed to be evidence of 
crimes of burglary, theft and theft by receiving would be found 
at the McArthur residence. See Addendum E. 
In support of the search warrant, the affidavit alleged that 
the Salt Lake City residence of a Mr. Clark was burglarized in 
early March, 1997, and items of personal property, "including 
numerous guns, computers, electronics, art objects, clothing, 
tools, alcohol, crystal, figurines, silverware, a Ford Bronco 
automobile and other items" were taken. Exh. 1 at 2. 
Additionally, the affidavit stated: 
Ms. Aimee Rolfe told your affiant that during the 
first part of March 1997, she was with Michael Todd 
McArthur and Dominic Newman when they said they were 
"going to work." The next morning when Aimee went back 
to Mr. Newman's residence, she observed the two men 
2
 The transcript indicates that the deputy's name was John 
Dellapiana. This appears to be incorrect. The Information, Search 
Warrant, Motion to Suppress filed by Appellant, and Memorandum 
filed by the state all refer to the officer as Deputy Vaun 
Delahunty. See R. 3-4, 24-6, 28-37; State's Exh. 1. 
4 
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unloading numerous items of personal property from 
Dominic's vehicle into his residence. The next day 
Dominic Newman took Aimee to the house where they had 
obtained the property, which is Mr. Clark's residence. 
On 30 June 1997, Aimee went to Mr. McArthur's residence 
located at 2802 East 3900 South, Salt Lake City, Utah. 
There she obtained a Kbar Marine Fighting Knife in a 
distinctive leather sheath from Michael Todd McArthur's 
bedroom and a Waterford Crystal cigarette lighter from 
an entertainment center shelf in the front room of the 
residence and gave them to your affiant. Mr. Clark has 
identified these items as being among those stolen in 
the above-described burglary. Aimee has seen a 
matching crystal ashtray on the above-mentioned 
entertainment shelf and two Lladro figurines in the 
home on 30 June 1997. Aimee observed the defendant in 
possession of a solid gold Dunhill brand cigarette 
lighter. On 3 0 June 1997, she used it to light up a 
cigarette. Mr. Clark has reported missing from his 
Home Lladro figurines, a Waterford crystal ashtray and 
a Dunhill solid gold cigarette lighter. 
Exh. 1 at 2. 
The affidavit did not mention that on June 30, 1997, Deputy 
Delahunty picked Aimee up in West Jordan so that Aimee could go 
to the McArthur house in the Holladay area and take some items 
out of the home. R. 114:18, 28. Aimee had told the deputy she 
could get evidence including a knife and crystal object from 
McArthur's home. R. 114:19, 24-5. Delahunty agreed to Aimee 
taking the property and told her, "that will be great." 
R. 114:65. The officer picked Aimee up and transported her to 
the house so that she could take the evidence out of the house 
and give it to him. R. 114:46. He knew that the house was the 
McArthur residence and suspected that it was the home of 
Appellant's mother. R. 114:45. 
The affidavit also did not mention that the deputy waited in 
the car in the driveway while Aimee took the items out of the 
5 
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house. R. 114:46. Delahunty admitted that he "was kind of 
nervous about the situation." R. 114:20. Aimee went to the 
front door, which was locked, then walked to the east side of the 
house, and the officer lost sight of her. R. 114:20. Aimee 
returned to the officer's car five to ten minutes later with a 
Tupperware bin containing personal property, a crystal ashtray 
and a Marine Corps fighting knife. R. 114:21. She immediately 
turned the ashtray and knife over to Delahunty, who kept the 
items and initiated a search warrant. R. 114:23. Aimee told 
Delahunty that she used a cigarette lighter, which she claimed 
McArthur kept on his person, while she was inside the McArthur 
residence. R. 114:66. 
Aimee reported to the deputy that she had entered the 
residence through the east door, but did not tell him whether the 
door was open or how she had gained access. R. 114:22. She said 
that McArthur and his niece were at home. R. 114:22. 
The affidavit also did not mention that the deputy did not 
obtain consent to search the McArthur residence on June 30, 1997. 
All of the June 30, 1997 information in the affidavit was 
obtained when Aimee entered the residence while Deputy Delahunty 
sat in his car in the driveway. 
Additionally, the affidavit did not mention that Aimee had 
been picked up after trying to pass checks which were stolen in 
the burglary. R. 114:4-5. Aimee had the stolen checks in her 
possession and therefore was in possession of stolen property. 
R.114:35. She had been cashing the stolen checks and admitted 
6 
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committing forgeries with those stolen checks. R. 114:35-6. 
Because she possessed property stolen in the burglary, Aimee was 
also a possible suspect in the burglary. R. 114:37. Aimee's 
work with Delahunty came about because she had been picked up on 
the forgeries. R. 114:40. 
The burglary in this case occurred on March 3 or 4, 1997. 
Deputy Delahunty, a burglary detective who had been with the Salt 
Lake County Sheriff's office for eighteen years, was one of the 
officers investigating the burglary. R. 114:3. He became aware 
of Aimee when Sgt. Wardell told him in late May or early June to 
contact Deputy Flores, who was investigating Aimee's forgeries. 
R. 114:4-5. Deputy Flores gave Delahunty the address of an 
apartment on Redwood Road where he could reach Aimee. R.114:5. 
Deputy Delahunty went to the apartment on Redwood Road and 
was told that Aimee had moved. R. 114:5. The occupants of the 
apartment gave Delahunty a phone number and told him that Aimee 
was living at that location with her boyfriend's mother. 
R. 114:5.3 
Delahunty located the address associated with the phone 
number he had been given. R. 114:6. That address was 2802 East 
3900 South. R. 114:6. Delahunty ascertained that the house was 
the McArthur home and believed that the house was probably owned 
3
 Appellant objected to this testimony as hearsay and lacking 
in reliability in violation of due process. R. 114:6. The trial 
judge admitted it "to show why he did what he did," but indicated 
that the testimony did not "go[] to the truth of the matter 
asserted." R. 114:6. Since the testimony was not admitted to 
prove that Aimee lived in the McArthur house, it does not provide 
support for such a finding. 
7 
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by McArthur's mother. R. 114:45, 48.4 
Deputy Delahunty went to the McArthur address on June 16, 
1997, and knocked on the door. R. 114:7. A child answered. 
R. 114:7. When the officer asked if Aimee was there, the child 
responded, "yes," then got Aimee. R. 114:7.5 
The deputy identified himself to Aimee and asked whether she 
knew anything about the burglary. R. 114:7. Aimee appeared 
nervous and asked to talk later. R. 114:7. 
The next day, June 17, 1997, Aimee went to the police 
substation where she was interviewed by Delahunty. R. 114:8, 14. 
She told Delahunty that she was at Dominic Newman's house late at 
night on May 3, 1997.6 According to Aimee, McArthur was also 
there, and he and Newman told everyone that they were "going to 
work." R. 114:11. Aimee said that everyone laughed because 
"going to work" meant committing a burglary. R. 114:11. 
Aimee said that the next day, she returned to Newman's house 
and saw Newman and Appellant unloading items from Appellant's car 
4
 During his testimony, Delahunty suggested that Aimee worked 
with him because "she wanted to come clean and get her life in 
order" and "got religion." R. 114:39. She did not approach 
Delahunty, however, and agreed to work with him only cifter she had 
been picked up on the forgeries and knew "she was in a possible bad 
position." R. 114:4-5, 39. 
5
 At the preliminary hearing, Delahunty did not testify that 
he had seen Aimee at the residence on June 16, 1997. Instead, he 
testified that the only information he had indicating that Aimee 
might have lived at the McArthur residence at some time was 
hearsay. R. 114:50. 
6
 The officer testified that this incident occurred on May 3, 
1997 rather than on March 3, 1997, when the burglary occurred. 
R. 114:11. 
8 
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and taking them into Newman's house. R. 114:11. The items, 
which included, among other things, guns, Chinese vases and 
crystal, were put in a closet or displayed in Newman's house. 
R. 114:11-12. According to Delahunty, these items were similar 
to what was taken in the burglary. R. 114:12. Aimee also told 
Delahunty that Newman had described to her how he and McArthur 
had disassembled the gate in order to gain entry, and had taken 
Aimee to the burglarized property. R. 114:12. 
At some point in mid-June, 1997, Aimee also told Deputy 
Delahunty that Appellant had some of the stolen property at his 
house, which was located at 2802 East 3900 South. R. 114:15. 
Aimee said that McArthur wore some of the stolen property and 
kept some in his bedroom. R. 114:16. According to Delahunty, 
taking the property from McArthur's home was Aimee's idea, but 
the deputy agreed to it and told Aimee it would be great if she 
got the property from McArthur's home. R. 114:19. 
On June 19, 1997, Delahunty picked up Aimee in West Jordan. 
R. 114:17. At that time, she was staying in West Jordan with a 
friend. R.114:17. The purpose of the June 19 excursion was to 
have Aimee direct Delahunty to the burglarized house, which she 
did. R. 114:14, 17. 
Between June 17 and 30, 1997, although Delahunty drove by or 
was near the McArthur house everyday, he did not see Aimee at the 
McArthur residence. R. 114:44.7 Delahunty testified that as of 
7
 According to Delahunty, Aimee had told him that she was out 
of state for a period of time in June 1997 attending to details 
after her grandfather passed away in South Dakota. R. 114:68-9. 
9 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
June 19, Aimee was staying with a friend in West Jordan and he 
picked her up in West Jordan on two occasions; he also testified 
that when he took Aimee to the McArthur residence to take items, 
Aimee indicated she had access to the house because she was 
living there. R. 114:19. Delahunty knew that as of June 19, 
Aimee had begun staying with friends. R. 114:64. He testified 
that he did not know where she was living on June 19, and that 
she may not have been living at the McArthur house. R. 114:64. 
He also testified that he thought she was living there "on and 
off" but did not ask her for consent to search because he "didn't 
feel good about" it since her name was not McArthur, and because 
he did not think "she had the legal right to grant a search." 
R. 114:54. 
Deputy Lone testified that the McArthur house was not 
Aimee's permanent residence, and that she had stayed there as a 
guest rather than living there on an ongoing basis. R. 114:74. 
Tracy McArthur, Appellant's mother, testified Aimee had 
stayed in the house for a little while, but had moved out long 
before the search warrant was executed. R. 114:79. Aimee 
visited occasionally, as she had for about ten years. R. 114:82. 
After Delahunty took Aimee to the McArthur house to get 
items inside, he drove Aimee to a friend's house, then initiated 
a search warrant. R. 114:23. Delahunty obtained the search 
warrant on July 1, 1997, the day after he took Aimee to the 
McArthur house. See Addendum E. 
Delahunty and other officers served the warrant on July 3, 
10 
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1997. R. 114:30. When they served the warrant, they entered the 
house through an unlocked sliding glass door on the east side of 
the house. R. 114:30. They found McArthur and another young man 
in a bedroom-type area in the basement. R. 114:30-1. 
As part of the search, officers recovered a number of items 
which Delahunty indicated fit the descriptions of items taken in 
the burglary. R. 114:32. Delahunty interrogated McArthur when 
he served the search warrant. R. 114:32. McArthur waived his 
Miranda rights and made incriminating statements regarding the 
burglary. R. 114:32-3. 
Delahunty did not know whether any charges were filed 
against Aimee. R. 114:25, 65. He knew that Deputy Flores was 
investigating the forgeries, but did not ask whether Aimee was 
charged. R. 114:26. He did discuss with Aimee "that there may 
be jurisdictions or other deputies or officers that would be 
looking at her for activity that she's engaged in [but that he] 
didn't know of any." R. 114:26. He also told her that "there 
could be some heat rolling [her] way, in connection with [the] 
forgeries." R. 114:38. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Aimee acted as an agent for Deputy Delahunty when she 
searched Appellant's home and seized items. Delahunty was aware 
of Aimee's search, encouraged her to conduct the search and 
participated in the search by picking Aimee up in West Jordan, 
driving her to the McArthur home in Holladay, and waiting in the 
driveway while she went inside and seized the items. Aimee could 
11 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
not have consented to the search of McArthur's home and Deputy 
Delahunty could not otherwise have conducted the search himself. 
The Fourth Amendment was therefore violated by Aimeers search of 
the residence. 
The search pursuant to the warrant was the fruit of Aimee's 
illegal search. The affidavit relied solely on items seized and 
observed by Aimee during the illegal search to establish probable 
cause to believe that items taken from the burglary would be 
found in McArthur's home. Evidence seized during the search by 
officers should therefore be suppressed. 
The search pursuant to the search warrant also violated the 
Fourth Amendment since Deputy Delahunty intentionally or 
recklessly omitted material information and conveyed a false 
impression about Aimee's role. When the affidavit is assessed in 
light of the omissions and misrepresentations, it fails to 
establish probable cause. Evidence seized pursuant to the 
warrant should be suppressed. 
McArthur's statements when he was arrested shortly after the 
search warrant was executed should also be suppressed. The 
circumstances indicate that the statements were not sufficiently 
attenuated from the police misconduct in using Aimee to conduct a 
search and obtaining a search warrant without accurately 
detailing information so as to allow their admission. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT. THE FOURTH AMENDMENT REQUIRES THAT ALL OF THE 
EVIDENCE SEIZED FROM APPELLANT'S HOME ALONG WITH 
APPELLANT'S STATEMENTS FOLLOWING ARREST BE SUPPRESSED. 
12 
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The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution 
protects against unreasonable searches and seizures. Amend. IV, 
U.S. Const. When a search is conducted pursuant to a search 
warrant, the evidence must be suppressed where the search warrant 
fails to establish probable cause, is the fruit of prior illegal 
activity, or when material misrepresentations or omissions 
impacted on the existence of probable cause. In this case, the 
affidavit in support of the search warrant was based primarily on 
evidence which was illegally seized by Aimee, who was acting as a 
government agent. Therefore, the search warrant was the fruit of 
the prior illegality. Additionally, the officer intentionally or 
recklessly misrepresented material facts and omitted material 
information; when the affidavit is considered in light of the 
misrepresentations and omissions, it fails to establish probable 
cause. Further, Appellant's arrest was the fruit of the illegal 
search; his statements to officers following arrest must likewise 
be suppressed. 
A. AIMEE ILLEGALLY SEIZED EVIDENCE FROM APPELLANT'S 
HOME, IN VIOLATION OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT. 
When Aimee entered Appellant's home on June 30, 1997, she 
was acting as a government agent and her warrantless search 
violated the Fourth Amendment. Moreover, she could not consent 
to a search of the McArthur home, and Delahunty could not have 
otherwise conducted a search. 
1. Aimee Acted as an Agent for Deputy Delahunty When 
She Searched Appellant's Home. 
While the Fourth Amendment protection does not apply to 
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searches conducted by private individuals acting on their own, it 
does apply where the totality of circumstances indicate that the 
individual was acting as an agent or instrument of the police. 
See State v. Watts, 750 P.2d 1219, 1221 (Utah 1988); State v. 
Koury, 824 P.2d 474, 477 (Utah App. 1991); State v. Knudsen, 500 
N.W.2d 84, 85 (Iowa App. 1993). 
In the "gray area" between the extremes of overt 
governmental participation in a search and the complete 
absence thereof, the search must be judged according to 
the nature of the governmental participation in the 
search process and in light of all of the facts and 
circumstances of the case. 
Watts, 750 P.2d at 1221 (footnotes omitted). The burden of 
establishing governmental involvement is on the defendant. Id.; 
Koury, 824 P.2d at 477. 
11
 [0] vert governmental participation in a search" or an 
express request by officers that the private individual conduct 
the search is not required in order to demonstrate sufficient 
governmental involvement to implicate the Fourth Amendment. 
Instead, passive acquiescence by officers in the individual's 
actions also implicates the Fourth Amendment protection. See 
State v. Anonymous, 379 A.2d 946, 947 (Conn. 1977) (citing inter 
alia, Moodv v. United States, 163 A.2d 337 (D.C. Ct. App. I960)); 
People v. Tarantino, 290 P.2d 505 (Cal. 1955); see also Koury, 
824 P.2d at 477 (first factor to be considered is "whether 
government knew of or acquiesced to the search); Watts, 750 P.2d 
at 1222 (same). 
The Supreme Court articulated "[t]wo critical areas of 
inquiry ... which bear upon the determination of whether a 
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private person or body has conducted a search as a governmental 
agent." Watts, 750 P.2d at 1222. Those two critical areas are: 
11
 (1) the government's knowledge of and acquiescence in the 
intrusive conduct, and (2) the intent and purpose of the 
person(s) or body(ies) conducting the search." Id. at 1222. 
"As part of the inquiry in Watts, the Supreme Court considered 
factors such as whether there was an ongoing relationship between 
the informant and the police, whether the informant was rewarded 
for his efforts, and whether the police gave the informant any 
direction or guidance." Kourv, 824 P.2d at 477 (citing Watts, 
750 P.2d at 1222-23). Moreover, in assessing these areas of 
inquiry, two basic principles must be kept in mind: (1) "law 
enforcement agencies out of necessity rely heavily on 
informants," and (2) the Fourth Amendment "preclude[s] law 
enforcement officers or agencies from having informants do for 
them what they cannot legally do themselves." Watts, 750 P.2d 
at 1221. 
In Watts, the Supreme Court held that an agency relationship 
did not exist where officers did nothing more than tell an 
informant that a case against him would be dismissed if he 
provided officers with information which led to a criminal 
charge. Id. at 1220. The Court reasoned that any subsequent 
search made by the informant was a private search. Although 
there was some governmental involvement, the "'offer' given to 
the informant was xfar too vague and general to constitute 
governmental knowledge of the search.'" Id. at 1223. Moreover, 
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the defendant in Watts was motivated by his personal desire to 
not be prosecuted for a crime. Given these factors and the lack 
of ongoing relationship between officers and the informant, the 
Court concluded that the informant's "specific actions were for 
the most part his own and were not substantially motivated by the 
prompting and encouragement of the [officers]." Id. 
In Koury, this Court did not reach the issue of whether the 
private citizen, Joseph Horvath, acted as an agent for officers 
when he observed cocaine residue in the defendant's house. 
Instead, this Court concluded that Horvath, who had a key and 
periodically entered the house to feed the defendant's pets, had 
permission to be in the house and that "it was proper for him to 
report [to officers] what he observed in defendant's house." 
Koury, 824 P.2d at 478. This Court concluded: 
We find no error in the court's conclusion that 
Horvath's entry into defendant's house was not 
intrusive and therefore, lawful. Accordingly, it was 
proper for him to report what he observed in 
defendant's house. 
Kourv, 824 P.2d at 478. 
In Koury, the officers did not direct Horvath in anyway, and 
conducted their own investigation after Horvath relayed his 
observations. This Court focused on Horvath's observations while 
inside the house, concluding that since Horvath had permission to 
be inside, he could properly report what he saw inside. By 
contrast, Aimee removed items, without permission to do so, from 
McArthur's house. 
Other courts have formulated tests similar to that in Watts 
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for determining whether a citizen acted as an agent of the state. 
For instance, in State v. Coy, 397 N.W.2d 730, 731 (Iowa 1986), 
rev'd on other grounds, Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012 (1988), the 
Iowa Supreme Court articulated the following test: 
Whether a private citizen has become an agent or 
instrument of the state depends on the total 
circumstances surrounding the challenged conduct. 
Factors variously considered and weighed by courts 
include: (1) whether the state directly or indirectly 
encouraged or participated in the challenged conduct; 
(2) whether the state, although knowing the challenged 
conduct was occurring or likely to occur, did nothing 
to prevent it; (3) whether the challenged conduct was 
intended to assist law enforcement officials or to 
further some other end; and (4) whether law enforcement 
officials themselves could have undertaken the conduct 
without violating the defendant's fourth amendment 
rights. 
Knudsen, 500 N.W.2d at 86 (quoting Coy, 397 N.W.2d at 731 
(citations omitted)).8 
Various courts have held that under the totality of the 
circumstances, a private citizen was acting as an agent or 
instrument of the government. See, e.g., State v. Becich, 509 
P.2d 1232 (Or. 1973) (Fourth Amendment violated where officer 
asked private individual to obtain items, drove by while 
8
 This test is essentially the same as the test articulated 
in Watts. The first two factors in the Coy test address the first 
Watts factor--"the government's knowledge of and acquiescence in 
the intrusive conduct." See Watts, 750 P.2d at 1221. The third 
factor in the Coy test is similar to the second Watts factor--"the 
intent and purpose of the person(s) or body(ies) conducting the 
search." Id. The final Coy factor is one of the basic principles 
articulated in Watts, 750 P.2d at 1221; if the , government could 
have conducted the search without violating the Fourth Amendment, 
inquiry into whether the informant was an agent or instrument of 
the government is unnecessary. Appellant's argument that the 
officer could not have conducted the search since Aimee could not 
consent to a search of Appellant's home addresses this fourth Coy 
factor. See discussion infra at 22-32. 
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individual was removing items from defendant's house, and met 
individual nearby to obtain items); Moody v. United States, 163 
A.2d at 339-41 (Fourth Amendment violated where officer stood in 
hallway while complaining witness entered through open door of 
defendant's apartment and obtained complaining witness's 
possessions which were in plain view inside apartment); 
Commonwealth v. Boreckv, 419 A.2d 753, 755 (Pa. Super. 1980) 
(Fourth Amendment violated where officer knew of search 
beforehand and acquiesced in search); State v. Bovnton, 574 P.2d 
133 0 (Haw. 1978) (Fourth Amendment violated by search by 
informant who was actively recruited by officers and paid a 
minimal amount for information over a year-long period even 
though officers did not direct informant to conduct search). 
In Anonymous, 379 A.2d at 947, the officers had several 
contacts with an informer who was "encouraged to continue his 
surveillance of the defendants and to furnish such information as 
he might acquire." Anonymous, 379 A.2d at 947. After the 
informer stole cocaine from the defendants, the officers used the 
cocaine as the basis for obtaining a search warrant. Although 
the officers did not suggest that the informer take anything from 
defendants' home, the court recognized that "they must have 
realized that the substance handed to them by the informer had 
been stolen from the defendants." Id. at 947. 
The circumstances in Becich also required suppression. An 
officer who was investigating a burglary questioned Boley, a 
suspect in that burglary. Boley told the officer that the 
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defendant committed the crime and that the stolen items were at 
the defendant's house and Boley could get them back. The officer 
told Boley that he would drive by and observe Boley taking the 
items from defendant's house, then meet Boley in a nearby school 
parking lot. After seeing Boley at the defendant's house loading 
boxes into his car, the officer met Boley at the school and 
received the evidence. He thereafter obtained a search warrant 
and found marijuana in the defendant's house while executing the 
warrant. Becich, 509 P.2d at 1234. 
The court held that the officer's involvement, including his 
request for return of the stolen items, his surveillance as Boley 
took the items, and his knowledge that he would need a search 
warrant, were sufficient to taint the seizure. In reaching that 
decision, the court recognized that the purpose for the 
exclusionary rule would be served by suppressing the evidence in 
that case. 
The purpose of the exclusionary rule in this type 
of case is to discourage officials from participating 
or engaging indirectly in searches which would be 
illegal if conducted by the official. It seems clear 
that exclusion of the evidence in this case would be in 
consonance with the purpose of the exclusionary rule if 
the extent of participation of the officer in the 
unlawful search was sufficient to make the police a 
party to the illegal search. The extent of official 
involvement in the total enterprise is the crucial 
element. 
Becich, 509 P.2d at 1234 (citation omitted); see also Boynton, 
574 P.2d at 1336 (recognizing that exclusionary rule served by 
suppressing evidence and that admitting evidence "would tempt the 
police to use persons unaffected by the fourth amendment 
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restriction to obtain evidence which they cannot directly 
obtain"). 
In the present case, pursuant to the factors articulated in 
Watts, 750 P.2d at 1222, Aimee acted as an agent for Deputy 
Delahunty when she searched Appellant's home.9 The first factor 
in Watts weighs in favor of finding an agency relationship since 
Deputy Delahunty knew of, acquiesced in, and even encouraged the 
intrusive conduct. Although Delahunty claimed that Aimee came up 
with the idea of searching McArthur's home and seizing items, the 
deputy acknowledged that he actively agreed to it and told Aimee 
that it would be great if she took some of the property from 
McArthur's home. R. 114:19. This conduct alone was sufficient 
to establish "the government's knowledge and acquiescence in the 
intrusive conduct." See Watts, 750 P.2d at 1222. 
Additional evidence existed, however, which established that 
the government knew of and acquiesced in the conduct, and 
otherwise created an agency relationship with Aimee. Delahunty 
directly encouraged Aimee and participated in Aimee's 
activities.10 In addition to telling Aimee it would be great if 
she took some things, Delahunty enabled her to do so by picking 
her up in West Jordan and transporting her to the house. 
9
 The trial judge did not make a determination as to whether 
Aimee was acting as an agent for the deputy when she searched the 
McArthur home. Instead, he concluded that the affidavit was 
supported by probable cause. R. 91. 
10
 The first Coy factor--"whether the state directly or 
indirectly encouraged or participated in the challenged conduct..." 
(Coy, 397 N.W.2d at 731)--weighs in favor of an agency 
relationship. 
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Additionally, he sat in the car in the driveway and immediately 
took the items from Aimee when she returned to the car. Further, 
Deputy Delahunty knew of Aimee's planned conduct and did nothing 
to prevent it11; indeed, he actively encouraged it. Hence, 
under the first Watts factor, an agency relationship existed in 
this case. 
The second Watts factor also weighs in favor of an agency 
relationship. The challenged conduct--Aimee's search of the 
house--was intended to assist law enforcement officials. See 
Watts, 750 P.2d at 1221. Indeed, Deputy Delahunty immediately 
took the seized property from Aimee and obtained a search warrant 
the next day. Moreover, Delahunty emphasized that he had nothing 
to do with any potential charges against Aimee, and indicated 
that Aimee was not motivated by any potential benefit to herself. 
Instead, she entered the McArthur house and provided seized items 
to officers to aid them in their investigation of Appellant. 
Unlike the situation in Watts, 750 P.2d at 1220, Aimee was 
not given a specific offer that charges against her would be 
dismissed if she obtained evidence against McArthur. Although 
Aimee faced potential charges, Delahunty was not responsible for 
those charges, and told her "that there may be jurisdictions or 
other deputies or officers that would be looking at her for 
activity that's she's engaged in, [but that he] didn't know of 
11
 The second Coy factor also weighs in favor of an agency 
relationship since Delahunty knew "the challenged conduct was 
occurring or likely to occur, [and] did nothing to prevent it." 
Cov, 397 N.W.2d at 731. 
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any." R. 114:26. Any possible benefit to Aimee in taking the 
evidence was so amorphous and general that it fails to defeat 
this factor. 
Finally, Delahunty could not have conducted the search 
himself. This fourth factor articulated in Coy, 397 N.W.2d at 
731, is one of the principles embraced in Watts, 750 P.2d at 
1221. Aimee could not have consented to a search as set forth 
more fully in subpart 2(a). Additionally, there were not exigent 
circumstances which would have justified a search. Finally, 
absent Aimee's search and seizure of items, the officers did not 
have probable cause to believe items taken in the burglary would 
be found in the McArthur home. 
Under the totality of circumstances, Aimee was an agent of 
Deputy Delahunty when she searched McArthur's home cind seized 
items therein. Appellant's Fourth Amendment rights were violated 
by her conduct. 
2. Deputy Delahunty Could Not Have Conducted the 
Search. 
(a) Aimee Could Not Consent to a Search of Appellant's 
Home. 
"Voluntary consent to search is one of the well established 
exceptions to the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment." 
State v. Elder, 815 P.2d 1341, 1343 (Utah App. 1991). Consent to 
search can be given by the defendant or by "xa third party who 
possesse[s] common authority over or other sufficient 
relationship to the premises or effects sought to be inspected.'" 
State v. Davis, 965 P.2d 525, 532 (Utah App. 1998) (quoting 
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United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 171 n. 7, 94 S.Ct. 988, 
993 n. 7, 39 L.Ed.2d 242 (1974)). 
In Matlock, the United States Supreme Court held that a 
third party other than the defendant could consent to a search 
where the third party had common authority over the area 
searched. The Court indicated that 
[cjommon authority to consent to search rests ... on 
mutual use of the property by persons generally having 
joint access or control for most purposes, so that it 
is reasonable to recognize that any of the co-
inhabitants has the right to permit the inspection in 
his own right and that the others have assumed the risk 
that one of their number might permit the common area 
to be searched. 
Id. 
A warrantless entry made pursuant to third party consent 
does not violate the Fourth Amendment where the officers 
reasonably believed at the time of the search that the third 
party had common authority and the ability to consent even if it 
is later learned that no such common authority existed. See 
Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 110 S.Ct. 2793, 111 L.Ed.2d 
148 (1990). 
The burden is on the state to prove by a preponderance of 
the evidence common authority to consent or a reasonable belief 
by officers that the third party had common authority to consent. 
Brown, 853 P.2d at 855. On appeal, this court reviews the trial 
judge's underlying factual findings under a clearly erroneous 
standard; it reviews the trial court's ultimate legal conclusion 
for correctness, according the trial judge "a measure of 
discretion." Davis, 965 P.2d at 532 (citing Elder, 815 P.2d at 
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1343) . 
In Davis, this Court held that the state had failed to 
establish its burden of proving that the officers reasonably 
believed that the defendant had common authority over a vehicle 
parked on the premises. Instead, the officers merely assumed 
that common authority existed without ascertaining whether the 
vehicle belonged to someone else or whether the defendant had 
joint access or control.12 Davis demonstrates that where the 
officer fails to establish common authority to consent, he does 
not have a reasonable belief that the search is proper. 
In Elder, this Court held that a homeowner's daughter who 
had been given keys to the house in order to pick up personal 
items for her hospitalized mother did not have common authority 
to consent to a search of the home's crawlspace. Elder, 815 P.2d 
at 1343-5. This Court reasoned that the evidence did not support 
an inference that the daughter had the authority to care for her 
mother's home. Id. at 1343. Although the evidence established 
that the mother gave the daughter keys to "xthe living areas of 
her home' to pick up some personal items," the daughter's 
testimony as to her authority was "at odds" with an inference 
that she had authority to care for the home, and "it does not 
12
 Davis involved the search of a parolee's house and 
surrounding property. Davis, 965 P. 2d at 527-28. The "common 
authority" test of Matlock applies to parole searches in 
determining what areas can properly be searched pursuant to the 
lesser reasonable cause standard for parole searches; areas where 
the parolee has "common authority" as outlined in Matlock are 
subject to parole search. Hence, the common authority analysis in 
Davis is applicable to third party consent searches. See Davis, 
965 P.2d at 531-35. 
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follow from the delivery of keys, with the request that specific 
items be fetched, that one has necessarily been asked to care for 
a home, much less that one has become entitled to invite others 
into the home to search." Id. This Court concluded that the 
delivery of the keys to fetch items did not give the daughter 
authority to consent to a search of the crawlspace, an area which 
was not entered with the use of the keys. 
Moreover, this Court concluded in Elder that it was not 
reasonable for the officers to believe that the daughter had the 
authority to consent to a search of the crawlspace because 
The officers who conducted the search knew these facts 
at the outset: (1) [the daughter] did not live at the 
house, (2) both occupants of the house were absent, (3) 
[the daughter] did not have a key to the crawlspace, 
and (4) [the daughter's] husband had to kick the 
crawlspace door open to gain access to the crawlspace. 
Confronted with these facts, it is not possible for the 
officers to have reasonably believed that [the 
daughter] had authority to consent to the search. 
Id. at 1344. 
By comparison, in Brown, 853 P.2d at 855, the Utah Supreme 
Court held that the owner of a trailer at a brine shrimp camp had 
common authority to consent to a search of the common areas of a 
trailer. The evidence showed that ground radios and the camp 
refrigerator, which was used to store food for all people in the 
camp, were in the trailer. The employees and owner could enter 
the trailer at any time to obtain food or the radios. Based on 
this, the Court held that the owner "had an unrestricted right of 
access to at least the common area" of the trailer and therefore 
"had the right to grant the officers authority to enter that 
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area." Brown, 853 P.2d at 856. 
The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals held in United States 
v. Harris, 534 F.2d 95, 97 (7th Cir. 1976), that officers had not 
obtained proper third party consent to search since the 
individual who consented did not have common authority over the 
property. Edwardsen, the third party, had known the defendant 
for three weeks and had been at the defendant's apartment a dozen 
times. During Edwardsen's last visit, the defendant had left and 
told Edwardsen to lock the door on his way out. Edwardsen, after 
being arrested, told officers that there was evidence of a 
robbery in the apartment. Edwardsen also told officers "that he 
had permission to use the apartment, but did not have a key." 
Id. at 96. In addition, Edwardsen told officers they could gain 
access through a sliding glass door, which they did. In 
concluding that Edwardsen did not have common authority over the 
apartment, the court reasoned that "since [defendant] did not 
give Edwardsen a key, it can hardly be surmised that he expected 
Edwardsen to enter and leave the locked apartment at will." Id. 
Since the lack of key was also known to the officers, the search 
violated the Fourth Amendment. 
In the present case, the trial judge found that (1) Aimee 
had permission to enter the McArthur residence on June 30, 1997; 
(2) she had habitually come and gone from the residence; (3) she 
lived at the McArthur residence; (4) McArthur "expected and was 
aware that Aimee had a right to enter the house on June 30, 
1997"; and (6) Aimee was a citizen informant. R. 90, 114:105. 
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The finding that Aimee lived in the house on June 30, 1997 
is clearly erroneous.13 The marshaled evidence supporting the 
finding that Aimee lived in the house on June 30 is as follows: 
1. Deputy Delahunty testified that when he went to the 
McArthur home on June 16, 1997, Aimee was there, and that she 
lived at the house in mid-June, 1997. R. 114:7, 16. 
2. Aimee told Delahunty she had access to the house. 
R. 114:17. She told him she had access to the house because she 
was living there. R. 114:19. She entered the house and returned 
with items from the house. R. 114:22-3. 
3. When Delahunty drove to the house on June 30, 1997, 
Aimee told him to park in the driveway while she went inside. 
R. 114:20. 
Delahunty's testimony as to whether Aimee lived at the 
McArthur house on June 30, 1997 was conflicting, however, and, as 
13
 The determination that Aimee was a citizen informant is a 
legal conclusion rather than a factual finding, and is incorrect. 
See generally Koury, 824 P.2d at 477 (determination as to whether 
individual was a police agent is a question of law) . A citizen 
informant is someone who is the victim or witness of a crime, and 
who "'volunteer [s] information out of concern for the community and 
not for personal benefit.'11 Kaysville City v. Mulcahy, 943 P. 2d 
231, 235 (Utah App. 1997) (quoting State v. Brown, 798 P.2d 284, 
286 (Utah App. 1990)). By contrast, "[a] police informant is one 
who gains information through involvement in criminal activity or 
who is "'motivated ... by pecuniary gain.'"" Mulcahy, 943 P.2d at 
238 n. 2 (quoting State v. Evans, 692 So.2d 216, 219 (Fla. Dist. 
Ct. App. 1997) (further citation omitted). Aimee was not a 
concerned citizen who voluntarily got involved out of the goodness 
of her heart. Instead, she gained information through her 
involvement with the criminal activity, became involved only when 
the deputy sought her out, and had concerns about possible criminal 
charges against herself when supplying information. Her 
information did not have the heightened reliability accorded 
citizen informants; instead, it was tainted by her involvement and 
self-interest. See discussion infra at 40-41. 
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a whole, establishes that Aimee was not living in the McArthur 
house at that time. Delahunty testified that as of June 19, 
Aimee was staying with a friend in West Jordan. R. 114:18, 19, 
64. Additionally, he testified that as of June 19, he did not 
know where Aimee was living, and that she may not have been 
living at the McArthur house. R. 114:64. When asked whether he 
believed Aimee when she said she was living at the house on 
June 30, Delahunty testified that he believed she had access to 
the house, "that she lived there, that she was staying there, 
living there off and on." R. 114:52. 
Additionally, on June 19, 1997, Delahunty picked Aimee up at 
a house in West Jordan where he thought she was staying with a 
friend. R. 114:18. Delahunty again picked Aimee up in West 
Jordan on June 30. R. 114:18. Aimee told Delahunty that "she 
had some of her personal property that she needed to pick up 
pending her move to her mother's home." R. 114:19. 
Given the contradictions in Delahunty's testimony and his 
testimony as a whole, the trial judge's finding that Aimee lived 
in the McArthur home on June 3 0 was unreasonable and clearly 
erroneous. In addition, Deputy Lone testified that although 
Aimee occasionally stayed as a guest at the McArthur home, the 
home was not her permanent residence. R. 114:74. Moreover, 
McArthur's mother testified that Aimee did not live in the home. 
R. 114:79. The clear weight of the evidence establishes that 
Aimee was not living in the McArthur home on June 30. 
Regardless of whether the finding that Aimee lived in the 
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McArthur home on June 3 0 is clearly erroneous, the facts 
demonstrate that Aimee did not have sufficient relationship with 
the property to consent to a search. Assuming that the finding 
that Aimee lived there was clearly erroneous, the remaining 
evidence of her relationship with the McArthur property 
established that she occasionally came and went as a guest and 
that she knew how to enter through an open sliding glass door. 
Guests do not have the authority to consent to a search. See 
generally Elder, 815 P.2d at 1343-5 (daughter who had keys to 
house could not consent to search of crawl space). 
Even if Aimee were "living" at the McArthur house, she did 
not have the authority to consent to a search of the house as a 
whole or McArthur's bedroom. First, the state presented no 
evidence that Aimee had common authority over McArthur's bedroom 
at the time of her search. The evidence showed only that at some 
point prior to June 30, Aimee, Appellant and Appellant's mother 
lived in the upstairs front portion of the McArthur house. 
R. 114:78. Aimee took the knife from Appellant's bedroom. 
State's Exh. 1 at 2. The state failed to sustain its burden of 
establishing that Aimee had common authority over the bedroom. 
See Davis, 965 P.2d at 534 (officers failed to establish that 
parolee had common authority over vehicle). 
Second, even if Aimee were "living" at the McArthur home, 
the state failed to establish that she had a sufficient 
relationship with the property to establish common authority to 
consent. The evidence unequivocally established that even if 
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Aimee were "living" at the McArthur residence on June 30, such 
residence was only temporary and sporadic. At the end of May, 
she was "living" in an apartment on Redwood Road. By June 19, 
she was staying with a friend in West Jordan. Sometime during 
June, she was in South Dakota. At the end of June, she was 
planning to move back in with her mother in Heber City and 
removing the last of her personal items from the home. 
At best, Aimee was a transient guest who was staying at the 
McArthur residence on June 30. As a transient guest, she did not 
have sufficient relationship with the property to consent to a 
search.14 
Under these circumstances where Aimee did not have the 
authority to consent to a search, Delahunty could not have 
conducted the warrantless search. 
(b) Delahunty Did Not Otherwise Have Authority to 
Search Appellant's Home When Aimee Conducted the Search 
on June 3 0. 
On June 30, 1997, Delahunty could not have conducted the 
search himself. He did not have a warrant, and none of the 
exceptions to the warrant requirement were met. Brown, 853 P.2d 
at 854. Those exceptions include: (a) consent searches, (b) 
searches involving probable cause and exigent circumstances, (c) 
seizures of evidence in plain view following a lawful intrusion 
or in a public place, and (d) searches incident to arrest. 
14
 Nor would it have been reasonable for Delahunty to believe 
Aimee had the authority to consent under these circumstances. See 
Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177; Davis, 965 P.2d at 534. 
Indeed, Delahunty acknowledged that he did not believe that Aimee 
could consent to a search. R. 114:54. 
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See id. 
As set forth previously, Aimee did not have the authority to 
consent. Additionally, McArthur, who did not even know a search 
was occurring, did not consent. Nor do the facts support a plain 
view analysis or search incident to arrest since McArthur was 
arrested days later, and the officer did not have a lawful right 
to be in the house. 
Moreover, probable cause and exigent circumstances 
justifying a warrantless search did not exist. The state bears 
an especially heavy burden in establishing probable cause and 
exigent circumstances when a warrantless search of a house is 
involved. State v. Yoder, 935 P.2d 534, 540 (Utah App. 1997). 
Exigent circumstances include circumstances where the delay 
in obtaining a search warrant "would risk 'physical harm to the 
officers or other persons, the destruction of relevant evidence, 
[or] the escape of the suspect.'" State v. Beavers, 859 P.2d 9, 
17 (Utah App. 1993) (citation omitted). McArthur was unaware of 
the police interest in him and therefore none of these concerns 
were heightened. In addition, there is no evidence in this case 
that any of these exigent circumstances existed. 
Nor did probable cause to search the McArthur home exist 
when Aimee conducted her search. Probable cause is based on the 
totality of circumstances; "" [p]robable cause exists where 'the 
facts and circumstances within [the officers'] knowledge and of 
which they had reasonably trustworthy information [are] 
sufficient in themselves to warrant a [person] of reasonable 
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caution in the belief that' an offense has been or is being 
committed."" Yoder, 935 P.2d at 540 (quoting State v. Dorsey, 
731 P.2d 1085, 1088 (Utah 1986) (quoting Brinegar v. United 
States, 338 U.S. 160, 175-76 (1949))). 
Although Aimee told Delahunty that items from the burglary 
were in the McArthur home, Aimee's reliability was suspect due to 
her possession of items stolen in the burglary and her 
involvement in other crimes, including forgery, which is a 
classic crime of dishonesty. See State v. Wight, 765 P.2d 12, 18 
(Utah App. 1988) (recognizing that crimes of dishonesty which 
impeach credibility under Utah R. Evid. 609(a)(2) are crimes 
involving fraud or deceit). Aimee's word was not "reasonably 
trustworthy" given her status as a police informant and her 
background to establish probable cause. See Kaysville City v. 
Mulcahy, 943 P.2d 231, 238 (Utah App. 1997) (police informant has 
less reliability than citizen informant); State v. Potter, 860 
P.2d 952 (Utah App. 1993) (reliability of police informant's 
information not established). In the absence of corroboration of 
her statements that items taken in the burglary were in the 
McArthur house, Delahunty lacked probable cause to search the 
house. 
Since an exception to the warrant requirement did not exist 
when Aimee searched McArthur's home, Delahunty could not have 
conducted the search. Aimee's search of McArthur's home violated 
the Fourth Amendment. 
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B. INFORMATION IN THE AFFIDAVIT WAS FRUIT OF THE 
ILLEGAL SEARCH; ALL ITEMS SEIZED PURSUANT TO THE SEARCH 
WARRANT MUST BE SUPPRESSED. 
The exclusionary rule requires that evidence obtained from 
the search of McArthur's home pursuant to a search warrant be 
suppressed. See Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 9 
L.Ed.2d 441, 83 S.Ct. 407 (1963); Borecky, 419 A.2d at 757. 
Because the evidence seized by Aimee during the illegal search 
contributed significantly to the affidavit in support of the 
search warrant, the evidence seized pursuant to the search 
warrant was the fruit of the poisonous tree. See Wong Sun, 371 
U.S. at 487, 83 S.Ct. at 417. Indeed, the connection between 
Aimee's unlawful search and the obtaining of the search warrant 
is not "so attenuated as to dissipate the taint" of the unlawful 
activity. Wong Sun, 371 U.S. at 487, 83 S.Ct. at 417. 
In Becich, 509 P.2d at 1234, the court held that evidence 
seized pursuant to a search warrant must be suppressed since the 
warrant was based on a prior illegality. "[A]n intervening act 
is required to purge the taint of the initial illegality." Id. 
(footnote omitted). Because the illegal seizure by the police 
agent in Becich "prompted the securing of the search warrant ... 
[and] [t]he progression was straight, from the initial seizure to 
the search warrant" and seizure of contraband, the court held 
that the contraband must be suppressed. Id. 
The court in Anonymous also suppressed evidence seized 
pursuant to a search warrant because the evidence seized pursuant 
to the warrant was tainted by the original illegal seizure by a 
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police agent. See Anonymous, 379 A.2d at 947 (citing 
Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385, 392, 64 
L.Ed. 319, 40 S.Ct. 182 (1920) (suppressing evidence seized 
pursuant to warrant because evidence seized pursuant to original 
illegality "was a highly significant part of the affidavit," and 
warrant was therefore "tainted with the original illegality as 
the xfruit of the poisonous tree'")); see also Borecky, 419 A.2d 
at 757 (suppressing evidence seized pursuant to warrant as "fruit 
of the poisonous tree" where "the sample contraband seized by the 
informant obviously supplied the foundation upon which the 
subsequent search warrant was obtained ... " ) ; Boynton, 574 P.2d 
at 1336 (suppressing evidence seized pursuant to search warrant 
where "search warrant was based upon the information gleaned from 
the informant's search"). 
In this case, the warrant was the direct fruit of the Fourth 
Amendment violation. Delahunty took the items from Aimee when 
she left the house. He immediately set about obtaining a 
warrant, as evidenced by the fact that he obtained it the next 
day. The affidavit relies solely on the items Aimee seized 
and/or observed on June 30, 1997 as the basis for establishing 
that items from the burglary were in the McArthur house. Given 
these circumstances, the affidavit and warrant are the fruit of 
the poisonous tree; items seized during Aimee's search as well as 
items seized pursuant to the search warrant should be suppressed. 
34 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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determination as to whether it supports a finding of probable 
cause. If probable cause does not exist without the excised 
material, the search warrant must be voided and the items seized 
under the warrant excluded "to the same extent as if probable 
cause was lacking on the face of the affidavit." Id. 
A similar approach is required where an officer 
intentionally or recklessly omits material information from a 
search warrant affidavit. See Nielsen, 727 P.2d at 190. The 
material which was intentionally or recklessly omitted must be 
added to the affidavit and assessed with the remaining 
information to determine whether probable cause would have 
existed if the magistrate had been made aware of the omitted 
information. Id. 
In Nielsen, the Court held that the defendant established 
that the officer had intentionally or recklessly included false 
statements and omitted material information from the affidavit. 
Id. at 191. The officer in Nielsen swore in the affidavit that a 
confidential informant ("C.I.") had given him certain 
information, and attested to the informant's reliability based on 
prior transactions with the C.I. At the preliminary hearing, the 
officer essentially reiterated this information. Id. at 190. 
Sometime after the preliminary hearing, the state revealed that 
the affiant did not know or have contact with the C.I. and had 
received the information from another officer who had worked with 
the C.I. Id. 
The Supreme Court found the state's argument that the 
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also faced potential charges of forgery and receiving stolen 
property. R. 114:4-5, 35-6, 37. 
2. Aimee's work for Deputy Delahunty came about because she 
had been picked up passing stolen checks. R. 114:40. 
3. On June 30, 1997, Deputy Delahunty picked Aimee up in 
West Jordan and drove her to the McArthur home so that she could 
go inside and take items. R. 114:18, 19, 24-5, 28, 46, 65. He 
also picked her up in West Jordan on June 19. R. 114:17. 
4. Deputy Delahunty waited in the driveway while Aimee went 
inside and took items, and immediately took the seized items from 
Aimee when she returned to the car. R. 114:23, 46. 
5. Delahunty did not believe Aimee could consent to a 
search. Aimee was, at best, temporarily living in the McArthur 
home. R. 19, 64. 
The omission of this information was intentional or 
reckless. Delahunty was well aware that Aimee was implicated in 
the forgeries, receipt of stolen property and burglary. 
R. 114:25, 26. As an experienced police officer, he certainly 
knew that this information impacted on Aimee's credibility and 
would be important to the magistrate in assessing whether 
probable cause existed. As was the case in Nielsen, any claim 
that the omission was not intentional or reckless is "entirely 
unpersuasive." Nielsen, 727 P.2d at 190. Deputy Delahunty was 
aware "of the need for accuracy ... [and] the importance of 
absolute truthfulness in any statements made under oath." See 
Nielsen, 727 P.2d at 191. He therefore was aware of the need for 
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First, the reliability of any statements made by Aimee were 
severely undercut by her involvement in the various crimes and 
her role as a police informant. As set forth supra at 27, 
fn. 13, the trial judge's determination that Aimee was a citizen 
informant was incorrect.15 A citizen informant "volunteer[s] 
information out of concern for the community and not for personal 
benefit." Mulcahy, 943 P.2d at 235 (citation omitted). The 
marshaled evidence in support of the court's determination is 
comprised only of Deputy Delahunty's testimony that Aimee was 
helping him out of the goodness of her heart and because she 
found religion. R. 114:3 9.16 
By contrast, the evidence unequivocally shows that (1) Aimee 
was not a volunteer; she worked with Delahunty only after he 
sought out; (2) she did not provide information out of concern 
for the community; instead, she volunteered information only 
after being picked up for passing checks stolen in the burglary; 
(3) she gained her information through criminal involvement; and 
(4) she had committed crimes of dishonesty which impacted on her 
credibility. R. 114:4-5, 26, 39. Hence, Aimee was a police 
informant. See Mulcahy, 943 P.2d at 235. 
Absent the omitted information, the affidavit implies that 
15
 As set forth supra at 27, the determination as to whether 
an individual is a police or citizen informant is a conclusion of 
law. While underlying factual findings are subject to a clearly 
erroneous standard of review, the conclusion as to the type of 
informant is reviewed for correctness. 
16
 To the extent this Court considers the determination that 
Aimee was a citizen informant, such finding was clearly erroneous. 
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Aimee's statements, the omitted information precludes the 
consideration of the items seized by Aimee. Had the magistrate 
been told that Deputy Delahunty encouraged, participated in, and, 
at the very least, acquiesced in Aimee's search of the McArthur 
home, the magistrate would have been required to disregard those 
items and the information that Aimee seized them from the house, 
as the fruit of the poisonous tree. See supra at 12-35. 
Aimee's statements as to what she observed inside the house 
are also the fruit of Aimee's illegal search. She entered the 
McArthur house under false pretenses as a police agent. Although 
McArthur allowed her inside as a guest, he did not knowingly and 
voluntarily consent for her to enter and search. Since Aimee was 
a police agent when she entered, the requirements for a knowing 
and voluntary consent to police officers to search applies with 
full force to Aimee. In addition, Delahunty did not search Aimee 
before she entered the house. Although he claimed she was not 
wearing enough clothing to hide the items before entering, the 
items were small and she managed to remove them without being 
seen by McArthur. 
Without Aimee's statements as to what she observed and the 
information as to what she seized, there is no information 
demonstrating that items taken in the burglary could be found at 
McArthur's house.17 Even if Aimee's statements as to what she 
saw inside the house were included, the affidavit would not 
17
 While Aimee had previously told Delahunty of McArthur's 
involvement, she also told him that the stolen items had been taken 
to Newman's house, not McArthur's. 
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 The good faith exception set forth in United States v. 
Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984), does not apply in this case. For the 
exception to apply, "the officer's reliance on the magistrate's 
probable-cause determination and on the technical sufficiency cf 
the warrant he issues must be objectively reasonable." Id. at 922. 
Reliance on the warrant was not objectively reasonable since 
Delahunty recklessly or intentionally omitted material informs :; :: 
See Potter, 860 P.2d at 958 (good faith exception does not apply, 
and suppression is appropriate where magistrate intentionally or 
recklessly misled by information in affidavit), Additionally, the 
good faith exception does not apply because the warrar.! w.-*--
obtained as the fruit of an illegal search. 
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Miranda warnings were given, the temporal proximity of the 
illegality and the confession, the absence or presence of 
intervening circumstances, and the purpose and flagrancy of the 
official misconduct." Allen, 839 P.2d at 300-01 (citing State v. 
Arroyo, 796 P.2d 684, 690-91 n. 4 (Utah 1990) (further citation 
omitted)). 
In Allen, the Court held that the defendant's confessions 
were sufficiently attenuated from any misconduct by Montana 
police, including arresting the defendant in Idaho, because (1) 
the defendant was informed of his Miranda rights and knowingly 
and voluntarily waived them; (2) the defendant made his 
incriminating statements more than a day after his arrest, which 
was "a sufficient period of time for the tension that arose 
during the arrest to subside considerable, if not completely"; 
(3) "[n]othing in the record indicate[d] that the alleged 
misconduct was an aid in the investigation"; (4) the record did 
not "indicate [] that the behavior of the officers in arresting 
the defendant was flagrant, in light of his belligerence and 
uncooperative attitude"; and (5) the illegal arrest occurred 
because the officers were in hot pursuit of the defendant. 
Allen, 839 P.2d at 301. 
In contrast, in the present case, (1) McArthur's 
incriminating statements were made immediately after arrest; the 
arrest itself was based on items seized in the illegal search, 
(2) the misconduct in using Aimee as a police agent to conduct a 
search as well as the misconduct in constructing the affidavit 
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immediate, there were no intervening circumstances, and the 
police misconduct in using Aimee to search McArthur's house, then 
using the fruits of that search to obtain a search warrant, and 
the misconduct in intentionally or recklessly failing to fully 
and accurately construct the affidavit were flagrant in light of 
clear mandates in case law. 
Because McArthur's statements were not sufficiently 
attenuated from the police misconduct, they must be suppressed. 
CONCLUSION 
Appellant/Defendant Michael McArthur respectfully requests 
that this Court reverse the trial court order denying his motion 
to suppress. Since Appellant's conviction was based on a 
conditional plea, Appellant further requests that his convictions 
be reversed and the case remanded for a new trial. 
SUBMITTED this j&t day of February, 1999. 
(\jk-<? (/toy 
JSAN C. WATT 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
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THIRD DISTRICT COURT - SLC COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
MICHAEL TODD MCARTHUR, 
Defendant. 
MINUTES 
SENTENCE, JUDGMENT, COMMITMENT 
Case No: 971901299 FS 
Judge: HOMER WILKINSON 
Date: June 12, 1998 
PRESENT 
Clerk: jaredl 
Prosecutor: JIM COPE 
Defendant 
Defendant's Attorney(s): REBECCA C HYDE 
DEFENDANT INFORMATION 
Date of birth: November 29, 1965 
Video 
Tape Count: 9.41 
22/2. ?£l<? 
CHARGES 
1. BURGLARY OF A DWELLING - 2nd Degree Felony 
Plea: Guilty - Disposition: 01/16/1998 Guilty Plea 
2. THEFT - 2nd Degree Felony 
Plea: Guilty - Disposition: 01/16/1998 Guilty Plea 
SENTENCE PRISON 
Based on the defendant's conviction of BURGLARY OF A DWELLING a 2nd 
Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term 
of not less than one year nor more than fifteen years in the Utah 
State Prison. 
The prison term is suspended. 
Based on the defendant's conviction of THEFT a 2nd Degree Felony, 
the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term of not less 
than one year nor more than fifteen years in the Utah State Prison. 
The prison term is suspended. 
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Case No: 971901299 
Date: Jun 12, 1998 
SENTENCE PRISON CONCURRENT/CONSECUTIVE NOTE 
Counts are to run concurrent. 
SENTENCE JAIL SERVICE NOTE 
There is to be no credit for time served, 
SENTENCE FINE 
Charge # 1 Fine: $10000.00 
Suspended: $10000.00 
Due: $0.00 
Charge # 2 Fine: $10000.00 
Suspended: $10000.00 
Due: $0.00 
Total Suspended: $20000.00 
Total Surcharge: $0 
Total Amount Due: $0 
SENTENCE TRUST 
The defendant is to pay the following: 
Attorney Fees: Amount: $100.00 
Pay to: 
LEGAL DEFENDERS ASSOCIATION 
LEGAL DEFENDERS ASSOCIATION 
Page 2 
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Case No: 971901299 
Date: Jun 12, 1998 
ORDER OF PROBATION 
The defendant is placed on probation for 36 month(s). 
Probation is to be supervised by Adult Probation & Parole. 
Defendant to serve 12 month(s) jail. 
Defendant is to report to the Salt Lake County Jail. 
a.m. 
Defendant is to pay a fine of $370.00 where the surcharge has been 
added to the fine. 
Commitment is to begin immediately. 
PROBATION CONDITIONS 
Usual and ordinary conditions required by the Department of Adult 
Probation & Parole. 
Submit to searches of person and property upon the request of any 
Law Enforcement Officer. 
Do not use, consume or possess alcohol or illegal drugs, nor 
associate with any people using, possessing or consuming alcohol or 
illegal drugs. 
Submit to tests of breath and urine upon the request of any Law 
Enforcement Officer. 
Violate no laws. 
Pay restitution as determined by Probation Officer. 
Submit to drug testing. 
Not frequent any place where drugs are used, sold, or otherwise 
distributed illegally. 
Refrain from the use of alcoholic beverages. 
Defendant is to enter and complete the Odyssey House Inpatient 
program. 
Defendant is to pay full restitution. Said restitution is to be 
imposed jointly and severally with the others involved in this 
matter. 
Defendant is to cooperate with the authorities in apprehending the 
others involved in this incident. 
Defendant is to have no victim contact. 
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Case No: 971901299 
Date: Jun 12, 1998 
SENTENCE PROBATION SERVICE NOTE 
There is to be no credit for time served. After 10 months the 
defendant may be released directly to AP&P for transport to Odyssey 
House, if bed space becomes available. 
Dated this it day of , 19?SV~ 
Paqe 4 (last) 
A t\ n A r 
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AMENDMENT IV 
[Unreasonable searches and seizures.] 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and 
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and 
no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affir-
mation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons 
or things to be seized. 
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REBECCA C. HYDE, #6409 
Attorney for Defendant 
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOCIATION 
424 East 500 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 532-5444 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH, 
SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT, DIVISION I 
STATE OF UTAH, MOTION TO SUPPRESS 
Plaintiff, : 
v. 
MICHAEL TODD MCARTHUR, Case No. 971901299FS 
JUDGE HOMER F. WILKINSON 
Defendant. 
COMES NOW Defendant, MICHAEL TODD MCARTHUR, by and through 
counsel of record, REBECCA C. HYDE, and hereby moves this Court to suppress all the 
evidence obtained as a result a search warrant issued on July 1,1997 and executed on 
the premises of 2802 East 3900 South on July 3, 1997. (See Attachment A). 
Defendant bases this motion on the grounds that the affidavit is not supported by 
probable cause as required by the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution 
and Article I, section 14 of the Utah Constitution. 
/ ) 
The affidavit is not supported by probable cause because portions of the 
information sworn to by the affiant, Officer Vaun Delahunty, ("Delahunty") Salt Lake 
County Sheriffs Office, were obtained as a result of illegal police conduct and should 
therefore be stricken. Specifically, all information obtained as a result of Aimee Rolfe's 
7 0 K
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("Rolfe") visit to the defendant's residence at 2802 East 3900 South on June 30, 1997 
should be stricken because Roife was acting as an agent of the Salt Lake County 
Sheriffs Office when she unlawfully entered Defendant's home. State v. Kahoonei. 925 
P.2d 294 (Hawaii 1996); State v. Becich. 500 P.2d 1232 (Ore. Ct. App. 1973): United 
States v. Reed. 15 F.3d 928 (9th Cir. 1994). 
Delahunty's failure to include in the affidavit material information as to the 
State's involvement in Rolfe's unlawful entry into Defendant's home on June 30, 1997 
was reckless if not intentional, and thus invalidates the warrant because inclusion of this 
critical omitted fact would have prevented a finding of probable cause. Franks v. 
Delaware. 438 U.S. 154, 98 S.Ct. 2674, 57 LEd.2d 667; Madiwale v. Savaiko. 117 F.3d 
1321 (11th Cir. 1997); United States v. Martin. 615 F.2d 318 (5th Cir. 1980). 
/ Delahunty also intentionally or recklessly omitted information material to the 
determination of probable cause by failing to include information that Rolfe was a 
suspect in a related forgery case, was a potential suspect in the burglary itself, and 
therefore was not merely a "citizen informant" but was a suspect and potential 
codefendant. Rolfe's statements thus lack the reliability presumed to exist with a citizen 
informant because of a criminal suspect's incentive to curry favor with the police and 
gain immunity for herself. Martin. 615 F.2d at 325-26. 
Lastly,! Delahunty failed to inform the magistrate that Rolfe was not 
searched prior to entering Defendant's home unlawfully or upon leaving the home and 
was not within his sight for significant periods of time. 
2 
0 0 0 0 " 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
The remaining portions of the affidavit do not establish probable cause. The illegally 
obtained information gained as a result of Rolfe's unauthorized entry into Defendant's 
home cannot be used to corroborate the remaining portions of the affidavit. 
No independent corroboration was provided to the issuing magistrate and no statements 
were made verifying the reliability of the informant, Rolfe. 
Because the search warrant was not supported by probable cause all 
evidence obtained as result of the search should be suppressed including Defendant's 
confession to the police. Wong Sun v. United States, 83 S.Ct. 407, 371 U.S. 471 (1963). 
DATED this / J ^ day of Decemb^iv-4967. 
REBECCA C. HYDE (-
Attorney for Defendant 
MAILED/DELIVERED a copy of the foregoing to the office of the District 
Attorney, 231 East 400 South, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 this |^"day of December, 
1997. 
ff^fiiy 
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REBECCA C. HYDE, #6409 
Attorney for Defendant 
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOCIATION 
424 East 500 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 532-5444 
FILED DISTRICT COURT 
Third Judicial District 
MAR 2 7 1998 
SAlJXAKE COUNTY 
Qoeuty ClerK 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH, 
SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT, DIVISION I 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
DEFENDANT'S PROPOSED FINDINGS 
OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
MICHAEL TODD MCARTHUR, 
Defendant. 
Case No. 971901299FS 
JUDGE HOMER F. WILKINSON 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
This matter came before the Honorable F. Wilkinson on December 22,1997 
on Defendant's Motion to Suppress the Evidence. The plaintiff, the State of Utah was 
represented by Richard G. Hamp, and the defendant, Michael Todd McArthur was 
represented by Rebecca C. Hyde. Testimony was received by this Court and arguments 
presented by counsel. Based upon the foregoing, this Court makes the following 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. 
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FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Aimee Rolfe had permission to be in the Mcarthur residence on June 
30, 1997. 
2. Aimee Rolfe had habitually come and gone from the McArthur 
residence. 
3. Aimee Rolfe was living at the McArthur residence on June 30, 1997. 
4. The Defendant, Michael McArthur expected and was aware that Ms. 
Rolfe freely came and went to and from the residence. 
5. Aimee Rolfe had a right to enter and leave the McArthur house on 
June 30, 1997. 
6. Aimee Rolfe was a citizen informant. 
0 0 0 
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CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. Though additional information could have been included, the search 
warrant was supported by probable cause. 
2. There were no material omissions made which would render the 
search warrant invalid. 
3. Aimee Rolfe was a citizen informant who had a right to enter the 
McArthur home. 
DATED this ^ 2 day of February, 1998. 
BY THE COURT: 
^)UDGE HOMER F. WILKINSON 
Third District Court, Division " 
MAILED/DELIVERED a copy of the foregoing to the office of the District 
Attorney, 231 East 400 South, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 this day of February, 
1998. - - v c ,c~" 
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If she had free rein at the house, she 
2 could get that property. That's not a 
3 search. 
4 And quite frankly, even if she didn't 
5 have free rein, if she represented to the 
6 police officers she had free rein, that's 
7 not a search. 
8 THE COURT: Well, I think there's a big 
9 distinction between the cases which the 
0 defendant's cited and the facts in this case 
1 as far as the informant is concerned. 
2 I think in this case, that the Rolfe 
3 girl had permission to be in that house, 
4 that she had been coming and going; she was 
5 living there; that the defendant expected 
6 her to be going in and out of the house, and 
7 that was a right which she had. 
8 I think that the search warrant which 
9 was obtained was a valid search warrant. I 
0 think more could have been put in it as far 
1 as the material, but I don't think the 
2 omissions that were left out of it make it 
3 invalid in any way. 
4 I think that she was a citizen that 
5 gave him that information. I don't know 
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1 that there's anything else you need to put 
2 in as far as findings of fact are concerned. 
3 But the warrant that was obtained was a 
4 valid warrant. The informant was a citizen 
5 informant, who had the right to go in the 
6 house, who gave the information to the 
7 police. 
8 The court would deny the motion to 
9 suppress. The State will prepare the order? 
0 MR. HAMP: We will, your Honor. Thank 
1 you. 
2 THE COURT: We're going to be in 
3 recess. Have you got that other case 
4 resolved? 
5 MS. HYDE: If I can have five minutes, 
6 I might be able to save us some time in the 
7 long run, Judge. 
8 (Whereupon, the instant proceedings 
9 came to a close.) 
0 
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RETURN TO SEARCH WARRANT 
NO. 
The personal property listed below or set out on the inventory attached hereto was taken 
from 
the person of Michael Todd McArthur and/or the premises known as 2802 East 3900 South 
by virtue of a search warrant dated the day of July, 1997, and issued by Magistrate 
Michael L. Hutchings of the above-entitled court. 
I, Vaun Delahunty, by whom this warrant was executed, do swear that the above listed or 
below attached inventory contains a true and detailed account of all the property taken by me 
under the warrant, on the day of , 1997. 
All of the property taken by virtue of said warrant will be retained in my custody subject 
to the order of this court or of any other court in which the offense in respect to which the 
property, or things taken, is triable. 
Vaun Delahunty 
Subscribed and sworn to before me this day of 
1997. 
MICHAEL L. HUTCHINGS 
MAGISTRATE 
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PAGE 3 
AFFIDAVIT FOR SEARCH WARRANT 
WHEREFORE, your affiant prays that a Search Warrant be issued for the seizure of said items: 
in the daytime. 
Vaun Delahunty 
AFFIANT 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO BEFORE ME this / day of July, 1997, 
tttK 
^ELLlllUTCIIINGS 
MAGISTRATE ^ ^ 
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PAGE 2 
AFFIDAVIT FOR SEARCH WARRANT 
and that said property or evidence: 
was unlawfully acquired or is unlawfully possessed, or 
consists of an item of, or constitutes evidence of, illegal conduct, possessed by a party to 
the illegal conduct, or 
consists of an item of, or constitutes evidence of, illegal conduct, possessed by a person 
or entity not a party to the illegal conduct. 
Affiant believes the property and evidence described above is evidence of the crime or crimes of 
Burglary, Theft and Theft by Receiving Stolen Property. 
The facts to establish the grounds for issuance of a Search Warrant are: 
Your affiant is a Detective with the Salt Lake County Sheriffs Office currently assigned 
to the Burglary Investigations Unit. Your affiant has been a Deputy Sheriff for 18 years and has 
spent the last two years working specifically with burglary and theft investigations. 
Ms. Dorothy Gant, the housekeeper for Mr. Michael Clark, who resides at 2550 East 
Brentwood Drive, Salt Lake City, Utah, has told your affiant that on 3 March 1997 she checked 
on Mr. Clark's residence while he was out of town and found everything to be in order. On 4 
March 1997, she returned and found the house to be ransacked and numerous items of Mr. 
Clark's personal property, including numerous guns, computers, electronics, art objects, clothing, 
tools, alcohol, crystal, figurines, silverware, a Ford Bronco automobile and other items missing. 
Ms. Aimee Rolfe told your affiant that during the first part of March 1997, she was with 
Michael Todd McArthur and Dominic Newman when they said that they were "going to work." 
The next morning when Aimee went back to Mr. Newman's residence, she observed the two men 
unloading numerous items of personal property from Dominic's vehicle into his residence. The 
next day Dominic Newman took Aimee to the house where they had obtained the property, 
which is Mr. Clark's residence. On 30 June 1997, Aimee went to Mr. McArthur's residence 
located at 2802 East 3900 South, Salt Lake City, Utah. There she obtained a Kbar Marine 
Fighting Knife in a distinctive leather sheath from Michael Todd McArthur's bedroom and a 
Waterford Crystal cigarette lighter from the an entertainment center shelf in the front room of the 
residence and gave them to your affiant. Mr. Clark has identified these items as being among 
those stolen in the above-described burglary. Aimee has seen a matching crystal ashtray on the 
above-mentioned entertainment shelf and two Lladro figurines in the home on 30 June 1997. 
Aimee observed the defendant in possession of a solid gold Dunhill brand cigarette lighter. On 
30 June 1997, she used it to light up a cigarette. Mr. Clark has reported missing from his home 
Lladro figurines, a Waterford crystal ashtray and a Dunhill solid gold cigarette lighter. 
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E. NEAL GUNNARSON 
DISTRICT ATTORNEY 
RODWICKE YBARRA, Bar No. 4184 
DEPUTY DISTRICT ATTORNEY 
231 E. 400 SOUTH 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: 3637900 
IN THE THIRD CIRCUIT COURT, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
AFFIDAVIT FOR SEARCH WARRANT 
BEFORE: Michael L. Hutchings 450 South 200 East 
MAGISTRATE ADDRESS 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
:ss 
County of Salt Lake ) 
The undersigned affiant, Vaun Delahunty, being first duly sworn, deposes and says: 
That your affiant has reason to believe 
That on the person of Michael Todd Mc Arthur 
and/or 
on the premises known as 2802 East 3900 South 
In the City of Salt Lake City, County of Salt Lake, State of Utah, there is now certain property or 
evidence described as: 
1. Waterford Crystal Ashtray 
2. Various Lladro porcelain statues 
3. Gold Dunhill cigarette lighter 
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RETURN TO SEARCH WARRANT 
NO. 
The personal property listed below or set out on the inventory attached hereto was taken 
from 
the person of Michael Todd McArthur and/or the premises known as 2802 East 3900 South 
by virtue of a search warrant dated the day of July, 1997, and issued by Magistrate 
Michael L. Hutchings of the above-entitled court. 
I, Vaun Delahunty, by whom this warrant was executed, do swear that the above listed or 
below attached inventory contains a true and detailed account of all the property taken by me 
under the warrant, on the day of , 1997. 
All of the property taken by virtue of said warrant will be retained in my custody subject 
to the order of this court or of any other court in which the offense in respect to which the 
property, or things taken, is triable. 
Vaun Delahunty 
Subscribed and sworn to before me this day of 
1997. 
MICHAEL L. HUTCHINGS 
MAGISTRATE 
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PAGE 2 
SEARCH WARRANT 
to make a search of the above-named or described person of Michael Todd McArthur 
and/or premises known as 2802 East 3900 South for the herein-above described property or 
evidence and if you find the same or any part thereof, to bring it forthwith before me at the Third 
Circuit Court, Salt Lake Department, County of Salt Lake, State of Utah, or retain such property 
in your custody, subject to the order of this court. 
GIVEN UNDER MY HAND and dated this day of July, 1997. 
Michael L. Hutchings 
MAGISTRATE 
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IN THE THIRD CIRCUIT COURT, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
SEARCH WARRANT 
No. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, STATE OF UTAH 
To any peace officer in the State of Utah: 
Proof by Affidavit under oath having been made this day before me by Vaun Delahunty, I am 
satisfied that there is probable cause to believe 
That on the person of Michael Todd Mc Arthur 
and/or 
on the premises known as 2802 East 3900 South 
In the City of Salt Lake City, County of Salt Lake, State of Utah, there is now certain property or 
evidence described as: 
1. Waterford Crystal Ashtray 
2. Various Lladro porcelain statues 
3. Gold Dunhill cigarette lighter 
and that said property or evidence: 
was unlawfully acquired or is unlawfully possessed, or 
consists of an item of, or constitutes evidence of, illegal conduct, possessed by a party to 
the illegal conduct, or 
consists of an item of, or constitutes evidence of, illegal conduct, possessed by a person 
or entity not a party to the illegal conduct. 
You are therefore commanded 
in the daytime 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
PAGE 3 
AFFIDAVIT FOR SEARCH WARRANT 
WHEREFORE, your affiant prays that a Search Warrant be issued for the seizure of said items: 
in the daytime. 
Vaun Delahunty 
AFFIANT 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO BEFORE ME this day of July, 1997. 
MICHAEL L. HUTCHINGS 
MAGISTRATE 
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AFFIDAVIT FOR SEARCH WARRANT 
and that said property or evidence: 
was unlawfully acquired or is unlawfully possessed, or 
consists of an item of, or constitutes evidence of, illegal conduct, possessed by a party to 
the illegal conduct, or 
consists of an item of, or constitutes evidence of, illegal conduct, possessed by a person 
or entity not a party to the illegal conduct. 
Affiant believes the property and evidence described above is evidence of the crime or crimes of 
Burglary, Theft and Theft by Receiving Stolen Property. 
The facts to establish the grounds for issuance of a Search Warrant are: 
Your affiant is a Detective with the Salt Lake County Sheriffs Office currently assigned 
to the Burglary Investigations Unit. Your affiant has been a Deputy Sheriff for 18 years and has 
spent the last two years working specifically with burglary and theft investigations. 
Ms. Dorothy Gant, the housekeeper for Mr. Michael Clark, who resides at 2550 East 
Brentwood Drive, Salt Lake City, Utah, has told your affiant that on 3 March 1997 she checked 
on Mr. Clark's residence while he was out of town and found everything to be in order. On 4 
March 1997, she returned and found the house to be ransacked and numerous items of Mr. 
Clark's personal property, including numerous guns, computers, electronics, art objects, clothing, 
tools, alcohol, crystal, figurines, silverware, a Ford Bronco automobile and other items missing. 
Ms. Aimee Rolfe told your affiant that during the first part of March 1997, she was with 
Michael Todd McArthur and Dominic Newman when they said that they were "going to work." 
The next morning when Aimee went back to Mr. Newman's residence, she observed the two men 
unloading numerous items of personal property from Dominic's vehicle into his residence. The 
next day Dominic Newman took Aimee to the house where they had obtained the property, 
which is Mr. Clark's residence. On 30 June 1997, Aimee went to Mr. McArthur's residence 
located at 2802 East 3900 South, Salt Lake City, Utah. There she obtained a Kbar Marine 
Fighting Knife in a distinctive leather sheath from Michael Todd McArthur's bedroom and a 
Waterford Crystal cigarette lighter from the an entertainment center shelf in the front room of the 
residence and gave them to your affiant. Mr. Clark has identified these items as being among 
those stolen in the above-described burglary. Aimee has seen a matching crystal ashtray on the 
above-mentioned entertainment shelf and two Lladro figurines in the home on 30 June 1997. 
Aimee observed the defendant in possession of a solid gold Dunhill brand cigarette lighter. On 
30 June 1997, she used it to light up a cigarette. Mr. Clark has reported missing from his home 
Lladro figurines, a Waterford crystal ashtray and a Dunhill solid gold cigarette lighter. 
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E. NEAL GUNNARSON 
DISTRICT ATTORNEY 
RODWICKE YBARRA, Bar No. 4184 
DEPUTY DISTRICT ATTORNEY 
231 E. 400 SOUTH 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: 3637900 
IN THE THIRD CIRCUIT COURT, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
AFFIDAVIT FOR SEARCH WARRANT 
BEFORE: Michael L. Hutchings 450 South 200 East 
MAGISTRATE ADDRESS 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss 
County of Salt Lake ) 
The undersigned affiant, Vaun Delahunty, being first duly swom, deposes and says: 
That your affiant has reason to believe 
That on the person of Michael Todd McArthur 
and/or 
on the premises known as 2802 East 3900 South 
In the City of Salt Lake City, County of Salt Lake, State of Utah, there is now certain property or 
evidence described as: 
1. Waterford Crystal Ashtray 
2. Various Lladro porcelain statues 
3. Gold Dunhill cigarette lighter 
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ADDENDUM E 
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